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Abstract: The Vatican's foreign policy between the two Great World Wars. The new mechanisms of foreign policy of the 
Vatican: The Concordats. Policies in Africa in relation to the Settler States. The relationship with the Portuguese dictator 
António de Oliveira Salazar. Papal diplomacy towards the NAZIS. Vatican's geopolitics has taken on a transnational and global 
character in a totally systematic and active way. Church in Europe would be the great purposes, eliminate the communism this 
is also the Salazar politic. Vatican diplomacy with the United States. 
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1. Introduction 
Vatican policies have always been changing in the course 
of time and adapting to the international contexts. [1] 
This Vatican policy has always been set up as a triangular 
relationship between Rome, national catholic communities 
and their respective States. [2] And it has always been quite 
complex, both by its structuring as well as by the motivations 
and impulses that condition it. In any case, we may say that 
Vatican policy has been quite different from other states, with 
very specific characteristics, regardless of the point of view 
in which they are analyzed. [3] 
2. After First World War and Until the 
Second World War 
During the expansion of dictatorships in Europe, Vatican 
did not remain inert. It avoids making direct policies and has 
privileged relations with Governments, taking eminently 
religious attitudes and avoiding political connotations. This 
Church that was going to live war, has attended in the 
previous decade to a strengthening of its ecclesiastical frames 
structures. [3] 
For Pius XI, Catholic Action represented something 
extremely important, an irrefutable instrument for the Roman 
Church, a way of being present in all civil societies. This 
association, with a set of restructuring and imbued with a 
new pastoral, would be part of the basic structures of national 
Churches. Catholic Action became diocesan, subject to the 
authority of bishops and parish priests, while in its center it 
was guided by the cardinal commission, which became a 
form of clergy, but which enabled Vatican to create a 
connection with civil and Catholic populations, regardless the 
relations with their respective States and Governments, 
conferring Vatican a great power. This issue has brought 
some problems to several Governments, including Oliveira 
Salazar´s. [3] 
Pius XII, following a very similar line to that of his 
predecessor, was never satisfied with the guarantees that 
concordat systems offered him. Pius XII Church intended to 
have its autonomous characteristics and this is where 
Catholic Action will be joining. The model of priest was not 
of the fascist organizations, or even armed forces or militias 
chaplain, congenital to the regimes themselves. The model of 
priest Pius XII intended was the “Father Leader”, head of a 
real community, distinct from civil society, which might even 
be gagged by regimes, that is, a community of laymen 
attached to Church, that shares their motivations and 
guidelines, but this could be pernicious to some governments, 
as we will further on see. Catholic Action came to give social 
consistency to a Church that wasn’t based on the 
confessional trait of civil institutions. [3] 
However, Church didn’t make a clear commitment to anti-
fascist action either, hence in this period, on the pages of the 
catholic press, a similar inspiration to that of the fascist press 
was noticed and not by imposition of the respective regimes. 
There has always been, mainly in Italy and Portugal, a non-
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political religious approach to fascist regimes, even in the 
years 1938 to 1943. In the Italian case, there was never a 
problem of church unity, as Holy See feared to happen in 
Germany. All the bishops and other clergy supported Vatican 
if church entered into open conflict with Mussolini, and the 
Duce himself was aware of the problems, due to his refuse to 
confessionalize the Italian State. In 1938, Italy undid the 
misconception of a catholic nation with racial laws, which, 
among other things, a relevant fact of the Vatican's view, 
were not in line with the concordat regime. [3] 
To deepen the perspective that Pius XI had on the racial 
issue, there is the insistence on the Semitic root of 
Christianity. The Pope thought that the cut with Judeo-
Eastern roots would mean the closure of Christianity in a 
political-ideological model that deeply displeased him and 
was also dangerous to his religious identity. This perspective 
was also clear to Mussolini, though in a very crude way: "a 
gesture of mine would be enough to trigger this people´s anti 
clericalism, whom had difficulty swallowing a Jewish God...". 
[4] 
At the end of the thirties, the political horizon of European 
Catholics was marked by barriers, whose overcoming 
triggered a worried or negative reaction. There was a clear 
consensus crisis, mainly on the participation of the 
Mediterranean countries in World War II. Overall, Catholics 
didn’t want war. Pius XII's radio message on his 24 August, 
1939 on the eve of the conflict, expressed a collective 
Catholic feeling, at least in Italy and Portugal: "Nothing is 
lost with peace. But we can lose everything through war...", 
[4] and the Vatican sympathized with Salazar's position, that 
is, officially, of neutrality.  
However, this position did not mean a denial of fascism, 
although it expressed some antipathy, sometimes smoother 
and sometimes less, in relation to it, such as happened with 
Catholic Action movements as well as in the faithful's 
communities. Vatican's reports on clergy´s behavior between 
1940 and 1942 provided a panorama away from opposition to 
fascism, an attempt to focus on religious issues and to be 
apart from political issues, along with a certain coldness of 
positions on war. This implied the growth of the episcopal 
role, but never got to the point of questioning civil authority, 
which was always formally respected. 
At the height of the war, Catholic Church appeared as a 
great supranational institution, rooted in all strata of the 
population, which will pass unscathed at the end of the war 
as well as at the collapse of fascism. [5] 
3. During Second World War 
The Secretariat of State was Vatican's body with greater 
responsibility on war problems, not only because its activity's 
diplomatic nature, but also because it was under its role to 
gather information from all world countries, including those 
at war. The Secretariat of State was who addressed Pope's 
directives to the different institutions and ecclesiastical 
authorities as well as to all other authorities and civil 
institutions. This was the cabinet which has collaborated 
more directly with the Pope, it was his closest team of 
advisers. [6] 
The experience at First World War was still truly present to 
the Secretariat of State and to the Pope himself, which would 
affect his whole performance during and after Second World 
War. This was what led Pius XII to declare "impartiality" in 
1939. Vatican staff was aware of the fragile guarantees in the 
Lateran Pacts, which didn't isolate them, in fact, from the 
occupied Rome. Furthermore, at some point the Secretary of 
State feared that the Pope could be deported by the Nazis. [7] 
There was a very wide expectation with respect to the 
action of the Holy See, the hypothesis of having a mediating 
role between belligerents was taken into account for several 
times, however, it was never enforced. The Holy See didn't 
have good relations with the various parties, hence relations 
with Hitler and Mussolini were quite difficult as well as with 
the Allies. Due to Stalin's hostile lack of communication, De 
Gaulle, the only truly Catholic leader, after victory, he was 
quite tough with the French Church, which was accused of 
collaboration with Petain. In this climate of isolation prior to 
Rome's liberation, Pius XII and his collaborators eagerly 
followed the diplomatic relations with the United States. 
Despite all these diplomacy issues, the crisis in Vatican 
and the siege against the Vatican State, with Rome's 
occupation by the Nazis, hundreds of people went to the 
Pope and Vatican City aiming for relief or support to their 
requests. Vatican's position was not comparable to Swiss' 
neutrality, which could be outside the conflict, with its 
borders closed, hence it was surrounded by the Germans. 
Vatican State was a hundred square meters, without real 
physical boundaries, the only one existing was a yellow line. 
Thus, Vatican's action was identical to that of the 
International Red Cross, which remained at a humanitarian 
level on the issue of prisoners, avoiding any strictly political 
position. This lack of direct intervention was considered an 
essential condition for carrying out humanitarian operations 
without alignment by any of the parties, which led to the 
debate on Pius XII "silences". In fact, these "silences" were 
indeed an option of the Pope and the Secretariat of State and, 
perhaps, it has influenced the Pontiff to act this way for the 
simple fact of being perfectly aware of Nazis' politics and 
their methods in the occupied territories, without however, 
during the war, having a perception of the amplitude of 
massacres perpetrated in the occupied zones. [8] 
However, these "silences" could also be a way of 
preserving the future of the Church in face of a warlike 
outcome, considered as uncertain, and, it was in this context 
that Salazar was perfectly supported by the Holy See, hence 
his dictatorship didn't have the totalitarian characteristics of 
the Nazis and openly cooperated with the Church.  
During the war Pius XII realized that these "silences" 
were not always understood by the Christian community, 
especially by Catholics who lived under very difficult 
circumstances, so the Pope argued that Holy See's cautious 
action allow him to work in order that war would end faster. 
Moreover, it was obvious that the Vatican had a terrible 
dread of a hypothetical German victory in Europe. 
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Considering that it would be a total danger for the future of 
Christianity.  
The conspiracy against Hitler had the collaboration of 
some clergy's members, such as the religious Bonhoeffer. 
The words of Bishop Von Galen, one of the members of the 
German Episcopate who had a very close relationship with 
Pope Pius XII, was totally enlightening on this issue: "It is 
true that we Christians do not make the revolution! We will 
continue to be faithful to our duty of obeying God for the 
sake of our beloved German people. Our soldiers will fight 
for Germany, but not for those men who dishonor the 
German name before God and before men. We will continue 
to strike valiantly against the external enemies. But we 
cannot fight the internal enemies with weapons, we feel pity 
and desolation. We only have one way to fight: resist 
strongly, actively, harshly! We become hard! We stand 
firm!" [9] 
In the last years of war, the Secretary of State worked in 
order to attract American interests in the country, in face of a 
real political crisis and a growing communist presence, 
already foreseeable by the end of the war. [6] 
The unity of the Catholic Church was always Vatican's 
main concern, and it was especially relevant during Second 
World War. That's why the Holy See was prudent in judging 
and condemning anyone who was always taking into 
consideration the positions of the national Churches. 
This is what happened in Portugal and concerning to 
Oliveira Salazar. The Catholic Church in general and the 
hierarchy of the Portuguese Church explicitly and officially 
supported the policies and the very person of Oliveira Salazar, 
communing with him his policies, Portuguese Church's 
hierarchy saw Salazar as someone who could give them back 
what the First Republic had withdrawn from them. In view of 
this relationship of brotherhood between the Portuguese 
clergy and Salazar, the Holy See acted in accordance and 
with a lot of diplomacy, only noting a dissonant note on 
Overseas issues, as we will later see. [10] 
In the German case, the Pope, who had been a nuncio in 
Germany, was well aware that German Catholics were 
involved in a nationalist sentiment, largely as a result of the 
mismanagement of the end of the First World War by the 
allies. Thus, each episcopate should judge and decide on its 
form of action as well as on communications to the public 
about the positions emanated by Vatican.  
On the US side, as well, one looked closely at Vatican's 
positions, especially in the last days of war. By 1944 the 
Holy See had already reached a remarkable pace of 
engagement in favor of the Jews, to the extent that the United 
States proposed a joint action on the Jewish question. 
However, Mons. Tardini, Head of the Secretariat of State, 
refused so: «It's not appropriate for the Holy See to travel this 
path: The Holy See cannot be related (nor by any means 
associated) to the American car, especially in the Jewish 
question. Holy See's action and activity must be independent 
and specifically of itself", [11] which summarized all of 
Vatican policy during Second World War. 
4. Vatican After Second World War 
After war was over and Rome liberated the Church 
assumed a special role, both within Italy and in the world. 
Vatican diplomacy has been constantly consulted by the 
United States. Vatican's geopolitics has taken on a 
transnational and global character in a totally systematic and 
active way. In the view of the Holy See, limiting communist 
parties and USSR’s range as well as strengthening Church in 
Europe would be the great purposes, and it would be 
according to these that Salazar was put up with, for both the 
Holy See and him had a common enemy: communism. The 
Holy See rather preferred a more right-wing dictatorship than 
a democratic country in which there was a left-wing tendency. 
This was postwar reality in Vatican policy. [12]  
In 1948, Pius XII spoke to French ambassador, 
d'Ormesson, "about the capital error committed by the 
Americans and British at Yalta and Potsdam, by granting 
Marshal Stalin far more considerable advantages than 
reason advised." [13] To which the diplomat later 
commented: “It is clear that the Pope is positively dominated 
by Russian-Communist concern. Everything seems secondary 
and relative when compared to it. Whether Moscow's policy 
will lead to a new conflagration, whether it is to sow disorder 
and misery, the germs of civil war, in Europe and in a part of 
the world, the two terms of the alternative are equally hateful. 
The Holy See stands before a tide of anti-Christianity. It is 
about stopping and fight it by all means”. [14] 
This point is crucial for a later understanding of Vatican’s 
position on Portuguese colonies in Africa, where, in their 
view, an authoritarian Portugal was preferred over Angola 
and Mozambique as geo-strategic points dominated by the 
Soviet Union, as the support for liberation movements 
suggested.  
In July 1948, Vatican and the US have straightened 
relations, thanks to the Marshal Plan for Italy. The Pope 
wrote to Truman welcoming him for the Economic 
Cooperation Administration and the Americans would ask 
suggestions to the Holy See about the Marshal Plan in Italy, 
which were promptly transmitted to the US Administration. 
The American military and economic presence in Italy was, 
since the beginning of Second World War one of the 
objectives of the Vatican and of his diplomatic policy. After 
1946 the Holy See circumscribed its commitment to specific 
problems and closely collaborated with the Italian 
Government on a common goal, which was that Italy should 
stay out of the Soviet system and the Communists to be 
marginalized from politics. But the Holy See was careful 
about the argument of some who said that victory over the 
Communists should be at any price. Vatican did not endorse 
this point of view, Italy, above all, should be a democracy. 
However, this anti-Soviet position was very welcome by 
USA as well as Oliveira Salazar. [15] 
In 1947, Pius XII had a remarkable speech. Saint Benedict, 
Patron of Europe, proclaimed Gospel and Romanity as the 
elements which "may powerfully unite the peoples of 
Europe", [16] and Italy should be part of this European world, 
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here creating a cultural border with the Union Soviet Union. 
In the 1940s, Italy should be a bastion against communism, 
with no internal yields, the Holy See was in favor of a 
Christian Europe in a suprablocs' perspective.  
The end of Second World War led to nation’s 
recompositing as well as of their respective social and 
religious forces at an international level. The main factors 
were the creation of NATO (1949), the European integration 
process, the creation of the World Council of Churches (1948) 
and the birth of the Arab League (1945) as well as of UN in 
1945. The Holy See welcomed the formation and 
composition of the various nations in unitary organizations, 
namely African self-determination movements, where Angola 
and Mozambique are inserted. At this point, Holy See 
diverged in relation to Salazar, and even received leaders of 
the African movements and missionaries expelled from these 
Portuguese colonies. [17] 
Pius XII's message was clear: although the Church was 
unknown to state discussions or outside the decisions that 
governed the new world political chess, Catholicism was not 
indifferent to people’s life. With the end of the war, the Pope 
celebrated two important events, giving it an international 
tone, the Consistory of 1946 and the Holy Year of 1950. Pius 
XII said at Christmas of 1945: "... after the end of the world 
conflict, we have the consolation, with the Lord’s grace, to 
see new members of the Sacred College come from the five 
parts of the world. In this way, Rome will appear as the 
Eternal City, the Universal City, the City caput mundi, the 
Urbs par excellence, the City of which all are citizens, the 
Headquarters of the Vicar of Christ, where the eyes of the 
Catholic world are directed "... [18] and strategically added, 
"Church is supranational, because it is an indivisible and 
universal whole, it does not accept to be or being a prisoner 
or either slave of this or that particular people, within the 
narrow limits of one nation...". [18] 
In 1947 Pius XII told the Associated Press that he hoped 
UN would soon be in a position to ensure an effective and 
lasting peace. 
However, UN’s condemnation of Franco's exclusion policy 
was not corroborated by the Holy See, hence for her hazard 
was East, not Europe’s remaining dictatorships of Spain and 
Portugal. 
In 1946, the Holy See sent an observer to FAO, which was 
Rome based, and the first international organization to 
receive such a representative from Vatican. In 1951, the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) appointed the Holy 
See a member of the Executive Committee of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
recognition of the service provided by Vatican's Information 
Office during the war. This was the first time the Holy See 
has actively participated in a UN body. In 1952, the Vatican 
already had an observer in UNESCO, in the person of the 
nuncio Roncalli. At the end of Pius XII pontificate there was 
an intense coordination of international Catholic activities, 
particularly focused on the Conference of International 
Catholic Organizations, with a permanent secretariat in 
Friborg. In addition, international Catholic organizations held 
three contact and information centers: in Geneva, for UN 
activity, in Paris for UNESCO, and in Rome for relations 
with Catholic Church’s missionary activity. [19] This last one 
would give Salazar some displeasures, as we will later see.  
It was necessary to clarify the relationship between Church 
and the contemporary world, as it happened in the Second 
Vatican Council, to form a better framework of Vatican's 
policies with those of other states. This clarification was the 
basis of a renewed relationship with the UN, which was 
considered the necessary forum of nations, though in a totally 
secularized way. UN formally condemned those countries 
who did not collaborate in peoples' self-determination and 
condemned the colonizing nations of Africa, where Oliveira 
Salazar’s Portugal was directly included. It was within these 
parallel barriers that Vatican diplomacy came to act to our 
country and its colonies. However, Vatican Council II made 
his position clearer with regard to African countries and their 
mission. Analyzed in a literal way, Council’s immanent 
philosophy was not favorable to Oliveira Salazar’ ideas, 
although, there were other conditions, which were signed in a 
Concordat with Portugal. [20, 21] 
5. Conclusion 
In the period between the two Great World Wars, Vatican 
has played a major role in international politics. Officially 
neutral, but without defense capabilities in relation to 
European dictatorships. 
Before World War II clergy’s diplomatic guidelines were 
that priests should assume a role as leaders of their 
communities, intervening even civically and politically. This 
role during World War II changes radically, the priest should 
be an attentive observer and not intervening in social and 
political terms. 
During the Second World War, the Church has not engaged 
itself on an anti-fascist action. 
Catholic Church’s greatest purpose during both World 
Wars was not to support and intervene actively with its 
Catholic communities, but rather playing a role of pure self-
preservation.  
After the end of the wars its policy was completely 
reversed, as it is no longer threatened, latched directly onto 
American politics and applauds the creation of the UN.  
Even today, diplomatic relationship between the Vatican 
and Nazi Germany are truly dubious. 
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